Temporary elevated access management (TEAM)

Temporary Elevated Access Management (TEAM) refers to a just-in-time privilege approach where users are granted elevated permissions for a limited time period to perform specific tasks. Rather than having always-on admin rights, a user requests the needed privilege, an approval workflow evaluates the request, and if approved, the user gets time-bound access that expires automatically​.

In practice, TEAM systems elevate privileges for human or machine identities in real time, providing granular admin access “on demand”​. This is similar to Just-In-Time (JIT) access: the idea is to minimize standing privileges by only granting high-level access when necessary and revoking it as soon as the task is done. 

For example, a developer might get admin access to a production system for one hour to deploy a fix, after which the access is removed automatically.

How does it affect identity security?

TEAM is important because it significantly reduces the window of opportunity for attackers to abuse privileged accounts. By eliminating permanent admin accounts and using short-lived access instead, organizations limit how long a compromised credential or malicious insider can leverage elevated permissions​. 

This approach enforces the principle of least privilege and zero standing privilege – users have no admin rights by default, so even if an attacker steals a password, it likely won’t grant high-level access except during a narrow approved time frame. TEAM thereby mitigates the risk of privileged account abuse and lateral movement. 

It also provides better oversight: each elevation is approved and logged, creating an audit trail. In sum, temporary elevated access strengthens identity security by ensuring that powerful privileges are both just enough and just for the needed time, reducing potential breach impact​

Case study

A well-known example illustrating the dangers of always-on privileges (and the value of TEAM) is the 2022 Uber breach. In that incident, an external attacker managed to infiltrate Uber’s internal network and discovered powerful administrative credentials hard-coded in a PowerShell script​. These credentials were for a domain administrator account in Uber’s privileged access management system, and because the account had standing (always-on) elevated access, the attacker was able to leverage it immediately. Using that admin access, the hacker breached numerous critical systems, including Uber’s cloud consoles and sensitive data stores​. 

Had Uber employed a TEAM approach, there would not have been a permanent admin password to find – administrative access would be temporary and gated by approvals. This breach thus underlines why organizations need to replace persistent credentials with just-in-time elevated access. Limiting the duration of admin rights (and not storing long-lived admin secrets in scripts) could have constrained the attacker’s movements, potentially preventing the broad compromise of systems that occurred.

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